

Transmission of scripture

Exegetical problems for Kumāṛila and Dharmakīrti*

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1 The notion of lost scripture in Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā

Looking from a broad perspective at exegetical problems concerning the transmission of scripture, one soon notices that not only Mīmāṃsakas but also Buddhists used the notion of lost scripture as a strategy to justify their teachings. The Vaibhāṣikas sometimes claim that their abhidharmic teachings are based on lost *sūtras*. According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra was able to observe lost passages by the force of *prañidhijñāna*. Here the Vaibhāṣikas postulate lost *sūtras* in order to justify their *śāstras*.¹

Ironically, as Honjo 1989 points out, the introduction of this theory allows their Mahāyāna opponents to use the same logic against them. Mahāyānikas can also claim that their teachings of a collection of dharmas (*dharmaskandha*), though they look newly fabricated, are in fact based on lost *sūtras*.

Vaibhāṣika: lost *sūtra* ← *abhidharma*

Mahāyānika: lost *sūtra* ← *dharmaskandha*

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¹ For the Buddhist notions of ‘the Buddha’s words’ and ‘lost *sūtra*,’ see Honjo 1989.

This ironical situation is somewhat parallel to that which Kumārila faced with reference to his Buddhist opponents. The exegetical device of lost scripture can equally be used by his opponent. It is also conceivable, at least chronologically speaking, that Kumārila knew the Buddhist sectarian arguments developed by Vasubandhu and other teachers. Then, how did Kumārila use the theory and develop it in his own way?

In this paper I shall first investigate Kumārila's theory of scriptural transmission with particular attention to the notion of lost scripture, and then compare it with Dharmakīrti's criticism of the Mīmāṃsā theory, because, as is often the case, Dharmakīrti's criticism can be best understood as being aimed against Kumārila.²

² The following is the list of instances in which Dharmakīrti's earliest work, PV I and its commentary PVSV, seems to presuppose (or criticize) ŚV or TV. I omit instances from BT and PV II–IV, because including them would lead to the complicated problem of their relationship.

- ŚV anumāna 12: *bhūyodarśanagamyā ca vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayoḥ / jñāyate bhedahānena kvacit cāpi viśeṣayoḥ* // → PV I 31: *kāryakāraṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt* // (Cf. Steinkellner 1997, Kataoka 2003a)
- ŚV codanā 137: *rāgādirahite cāsmiṇ nirvyāpāre vyavasthite / deśa-nānyapraṇītaiva syād rte pratyavekṣaṇāt* // → PV I 12: *vipakṣe 'dṛṣṭi-mātreṇa kāryasāmānyadarśanāt / hetujñānaṃ pramāṇābhaṃ vacanād rāgitādivat* // (Cf. Dunne 1996:527, Kataoka 2003a, 2003b)
- TV ad 1.3.2, 163.21–22: *bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṃvākyād vipralambhanāt / dṛṣṭānugūnyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī* //, 164.16: *śiṣṭatraivarṇikadṛḍhasmaraṇānyathānupapattilabhyatvāc chruṭy-anumānasya*; 1.3.4, 186.8–9: *itaś ca na pramāṇatvaṃ mūlahetvantarekṣaṇāt / vyabhicāre hi notpattir arthāpattyanumānayoḥ* //; 1.3.3–4, 195.29–30: *śākyādāyaś ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām / hetujālavīnirmuktām na kadācana kurvate* // → PV I 216: *āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyād anumānatā / buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare* // (Kataoka 2011)
- ŚV vākya 366: *vedasyādhyayanam sarvaṃ gurvādhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyaṭvād adhunādhyayanam yathā* // → PVSV 124.27–28: *tasmād adhyayanam adhyayanāntarapūrvakam adhyayanād iti bhāratādhyayane 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāri*; 125.4–5: *yat kiṃcid vedādhyayanam sarvaṃ tad adhyayanāntarapūrvakam ity api vyāptir na sidh-*

2 Dharma and scripture in the Mīmāṃsā tradition

Jaiminisūtra 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 presuppose that the Veda alone is the valid source of religious information and that human beings do not have direct access to dharma.³ Perception is incapable of telling you that

yati. (Cf. Eltschinger 2007:471) *It is also possible to regard this as representing general Mīmāṃsā view and not necessarily Kumārila's.

- ŚV *apoha* 1: **agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyam** vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / *gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktam ago'pohagirā sphuṭam* // → PV I 64: *tenānyāpohaviṣaye tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam* / *pratyākhyātaṃ pṛthaktve hi syād doṣo jātivadatoḥ* //, PVSV 32.17: *tasmād yaiva vyāvṛttiḥ sa eva vyāvṛttaḥ*. (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *apoha* 83–85ab: *siddhaś cāgaur apohyeta goniṣedhātmakeś ca saḥ / tatra gaur eva vaktavyo nañā yaḥ pratiṣidhyate* // *sa ced agonivṛttyātmā bhaved anyonyasamśrayaḥ / siddhaś ced gaur apohyārthaṃ vṛthāpohaprakalpanā* // *gavy asiddhe tv agaur nāsti tadabhāve ca gauḥ kutaḥ* / → PV I 113cd–114: *avṛkṣavyatirekeṇa vṛkṣārthagrahaṇe dvayam* // **anyonyāśrayam** ity ekagrahābhāve dvayāgrahaḥ / *saṃketāsambhavas tasmād iti kecit pracakṣate* // (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *apoha* 144: *ananyāpohaśabdādaḥ vācyaṃ na ca nirūpyate* / **prameyajñeyaśabdāder** apohyaṃ kuta eva tu // → PV I 122–123: *kvacin niveśanāyārthe vinivartya kutaścana / buddheḥ prayujyate śabdāstadarthasyādvadhāraṇāt* // *vyartha 'nyathā prayogaḥ syāt taj jñeyādi-padeṣv api* / *vyavahāropanīteṣu vyavacchedyo 'sti kaścana* // (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *abhāva* 1: *pramāṇapañcakaṃ yatra vasturūpe na jāyate / vastusattvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāvapramāṇatā* //, 11: *pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva ucyate / sātmanaḥ pariṇāmo vā vijñānam vānyavastuni* // → PV I 3: *apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānām apravṛttiphalāṣati / asajjñānaphalā kācid dhetubhedavyapekṣayā* // (Cf. Kellner 2003)

³ JS 1.1.4: *satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt* / “When there is a connection of the sense-faculties [with objects], a cognition arises for a person. That is perception. [It is] not the cause [for knowing dharma], because [it] perceives [only] a present [object].” (See Franco & Preisendanz 1995 and Taber 2006 for possible interpretations of this *pratyakṣasūtra*.)

JS 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapেকṣatvāt* / “On the other hand, the relationship of speech with a meaning is innate. [Therefore] a [Vedic] teaching is the means of knowing that [dharma]. In addition, [a Vedic teaching] does not devi-

such and such an action will bring you a quantity of cows or heaven after death.

<i>prameya</i>		<i>pramāṇa</i>
φ	←	perception
dharma	←	Veda

Dharma in the Mīmāṃsā tradition is *yāgādi*, i.e. sacrifice and such. But ritual action by itself does not constitute dharma. The essential nature of dharma lies in its capacity of being the cause of accomplishing the desired result. In other words, dharma is not ritual action itself but ritual action qualified as being the cause of heaven, etc.⁴ Essentially, dharma can be regarded as consisting in the causal link between a particular ritual and particular result.⁵

ate from [the object even] when the object is not perceived. [Therefore] that [teaching] is a [primary, independent] *pramāṇa*, according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it does not depend on [another *pramāṇa*]. (A straightforward interpretation.)

According to Śabara's interpretation, this *sūtra* can be translated as follows: "On the other hand, the innate [and eternal] relationship of speech with a meaning is the means of knowing that [dharma] when that object [i.e. dharma] is not perceived, [because there is] a [Vedic] teaching. And [the cognition produced by the teaching] does not deviate [from the object]. [Therefore] that [cognition produced by a Vedic teaching] is a [primary, independent] *pramāṇa*, according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it does not depend on [another *pramāṇa*]."

⁴ ŚV *codanā* 13–14: *dravyakriyāguṇādīnāṃ dharmatvaṃ sthāpayiṣyate / teṣāṃ aindriyakatve 'pi na tādrūpyeṇa dharmatā // śreyaḥsāadhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratiyate / tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriyagocaraḥ //* "It will be established later that material, action, quality and so on are dharmas. Though they are perceptible, they are not dharmas as such[, i.e. ordinary objects of perception]. For, that these are the means of accomplishing the supreme end is always understood from the Veda [alone], and [they are] dharmas as such. Therefore [a dharma is] not an object of the sense-faculties."

⁵ TV ad 1.3.1, 160.14: *tad ihāṣṭakādīnāṃ svargādisādhyasāadhanabhāvaṃ pratyakṣādīni tāvan na grhṇantīti sādhitam*. "In this case, however, it is already established that perception, etc., at least do not grasp the causal relationship between the Aṣṭakā ritual, etc., and heaven, etc."

<i>sādhana</i>		<i>sādhya</i>
dharma: ritual	→	fruit

Heaven, for example, will be obtained in the future after death and therefore cannot be perceived by human beings, because perception grasps only present things through the connection between the sense faculty and an object.⁶ As Śābara remarks, “a human being is not able to know it without a Vedic statement” (*aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*).⁷ Human beings have to rely on Vedic teachings in order to know dharma.

3 Manu and the Buddha with regard to religious matters

This is the case for any human being. Even sages such as Manu, the author of the *Manusmṛti*, cannot directly perceive dharma, not to speak of heretical teachers, such as the Buddha, the Jina and Kapila.⁸ Those heretical teachers who claim to be omniscient (*sarvajña*) and to be able to cognize dharma (*dharmajña*) are liars. They are motivated by evil causes such as passion (*rāgādi*). They speak of dharma out of mundane desires. They may give lip service to teaching moral duties such as *ahiṃsā*. But these are mixed with pseudo-dharmas (*dharmābhāsa*) and therefore useless and unreliable, like milk contained in a drinking skin made of dog leather (*śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravat*).⁹

⁶ ŚBh ad 1.1.4, F 22.14–15: *bhaviṣyaṃś caiṣo 'rtho na jñānakāle 'sti. sataś caitad upalambhanam, nāsataḥ. ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam*. “And this object [i.e. dharma], being future, is not present at the time of cognition. Moreover, this [perception] is a means of apprehending something that is present, not one that is absent. Therefore, perception is not the cause [of knowing dharma].”

⁷ ŚBh ad 1.1.2, F 18.5–6.

⁸ For the arguments of this section, see Kataoka 2011.

⁹ TV 203.13–14: *tadabhiprāyakalpī tad dharmābhāsam adhyapatitaṃ sanmūlam apy ahiṃsādi śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravat anupayogy aviśrambhañīyaṃ ca tanmātropalabdhaṃ bhavati*. “Therefore, because *ahiṃsā* and so forth, though based on a correct source, has fallen among pseudo-

Manu, on the other hand, is not motivated by any evil cause. His dharmic knowledge therefore must have derived from his direct experience of hearing the Veda. For *smṛti* is based on *śruti*; recollection is preceded by the direct experience of hearing.¹⁰ As Kumārila clarifies, it is *arthāpatti* that distinguishes Manu's teaching from the Buddha's. Manu's teaching of dharma is not explicable, i.e. *anyathā nopapadyate*, unless we assume that it is based on Vedic injunction (*codanā*), whereas the Buddha's teaching can be well explained without assuming that, *anyathāpy upapadyate*, because it is based on evil causes such as *rāga*. Manu's teaching suggests the existence of original Vedic passages, whereas the Buddha's teaching suggests something else, such as deception motivated by human desire.¹¹

		<i>hetu</i>		<i>pauruṣeyavacana</i>
dharma	←	<i>śruti</i>	←	<i>Manusmṛti</i>
φ	←	<i>rāgādi</i>	←	Buddhavacana

4 Postulation of lost scripture

The exegetical problem lies here. The Vedic passage postulated on the basis of Manu's teaching is not directly accessible to us. The passage in question is not perceivable but only to be inferred. It is not a *pratyakṣaśruti* but an *anumitaśruti*. The Vedic passage may have

dharmas fabricated by their [creators'] own intention, it is neither useful nor reliable, like milk contained in a [drinking] skin [made] of dog [leather]. It is perceived only by the [Buddha and so on without relying on a correct source]."

¹⁰ For the status of human speech in Mīmāṃsā exegesis, see Kataoka 2007.

¹¹ Dharmakīrti's reply is that the Buddha is rather motivated by compassion. PVSV 9.11: *na yuktaḥ, vītarāgatvād iti cet. na, karuṇayāpi vṛtteḥ*. "[Opponent:] It is impossible, because he is free of desire. [Reply:] No, because [it is possible that] he acts [being motivated] by compassion." See Dunne 1996.

been available to the ancient sages but is so no longer. The passage in question is imperceivable. Śābara phrases the problem as follows:¹²

The next problem is: Suppose that we do not perceive a Vedic statement with regard to some [dharma] but nonetheless have recollection/tradition [such as the *Manusmṛti*] on it in such a way: “This is to be done in this way and for this purpose.” Should that [object not explicitly enjoined in a Vedic injunction] be [regarded as something to be done] exactly as [it is taught in the *smṛti*]?

Manu teaches the Aṣṭakā ritual and other that have to be performed (*kartavya*). But an original Vedic passage is no longer available. We do not have a *śruti* passage but only a *smṛti* passage. *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.2 concludes that *anumāna* is the valid source (*pramāṇa*) in this case.¹³ Manu’s recollection (*smṛti*) functions as an inferential reason (*anumāna*) that leads us to infer the original Vedic source that is not directly perceivable.

Kumārila specifies this procedure of postulation as a kind of *arthāpatti* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam*.¹⁴ But wait! Couldn’t this procedure be similarly applicable to the Buddha’s teaching? If Mīmāṃsakas claim that a Vedic source, though imperceptible, is to be postulated from Manu’s teaching, then Buddhists can similarly claim that the Buddha’s teaching of dharma is in fact based on a lost Vedic passage.¹⁵

¹² ŚBh ad 1.3.1, 159.10–12: *athedānīm yatra na vaidikaṃ śabdāṃ upalabhe-maḥi, atha ca smaranti “evam ayam artho ’nuṣṭhātavyaḥ, etasmai ca pra-yojanāya” iti, kim asau tathaiva syān na veti.*

¹³ JS 1.3.2: *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt /*

¹⁴ TV ad 1.3.1, 161.18–19 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *yadi hi śrutikalpanena vinā smṛtir nopapadyate, tataḥ samyagmūlā syāt. sambhavati tu svapnamūlatvena. tenānaikāntyād arthāpatteḥ sāmānyatodṛṣṭasya vānavakāśaḥ.* “If the *smṛti* were not explicable without postulating a *śruti*, it could be based on a correct [Vedic] source. But it can also be based on a dream. Therefore, due to inconclusiveness, there is no room for *arthāpatti* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam* [*anumānam*].”

¹⁵ This argument is parallel with another argument of Kumārila about the postulation of the *dharmajñas*’ original experience. If someone claimed, on the grounds that the teaching would be impossible other-

lost scripture		dharmic teaching
(scripture)	→	Manu's recollection
(scripture)	→	Buddha's teaching

5 Kumārila's anxiety

This anxiety is real for Kumārila. He is well aware of the possibility that his Buddhist opponents may counter against him by using the same logic.¹⁶

On the other hand, if it were postulated that [the tradition promulgated by Manu and other orthodox teachers] is based on lost branches of the Veda, then it would undesirably be possible that any tradition (*smṛti*) promulgated by the Buddha and other [heterodox teachers] are also valid through the same procedure [of postulating a lost Veda]. And one could make anything one wants valid by casting it into the mouth of a lost Vedic branch.

In this way, the notion of “a lost branch of the Veda” (*pralīnaśākhā*), though it looks very convenient at first glance, can lead to problems. In using it, Mīmāṃsakas need to somehow set up a restriction in

wise (*arthāpatti*), or by *sāmānyatodrṣṭam anumānam*, that Manu and other orthodox teachers must have directly perceived dharmas, heretical opponents could similarly counterattack that their teachers such as the Buddha must have directly perceived dharmas.

postulated		dharmic teaching
(scripture)	←	Manu's recollection
(perception)	←	Buddha's teaching

Kumārila explains this possibility in ŚV *codanā* 156–157 and BṬ (TS 3216–20). Both prove the human experience of dharma on the ground that it would be otherwise impossible or do so by analogical inference. See Kataoka 2011.

¹⁶ TV ad 1.3.1, 163.8–10: *yadi tu pralīnaśākhāmūlatā kalpyeta, tataḥ sarvā-sāṃ buddhādismṛtīnām api taddvāraṃ prāmāṇyaṃ prasajyate. yasyaiva ca yad abhipretam, sa eva tat pralīnaśākhāmastake nikṣīpya pramāṇī-kuryāt.*

order to be able to defeat heretics without allowing a parallel counterargument. But what exactly is the criterion that can allow them to use the device safely?

6 Background of Kumāri-la's criticism

Although the commentator Śabara and the subcommentator Kumāri-la discuss the same topic, i.e. the authoritativeness of *smṛtis*, they differ very much in their attitude and perspective. Let me first give an overview of Śabara's 'traditional' interpretation of JS 1.3.1–7.

1.3.1 (*pūrva*): *dharmasya śabdamūlatvād aśabdam anapekṣyaṃ syāt*

1.3.2 (*uttara*): *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt*

1.3.3 (*uttara*): *virodhe tv anapekṣyaṃ syād asati hy anumānam*

1.3.4 (*uttara*): *hetudarśanāc ca*

1.3.5 (*uttara*): *śiṣṭākope 'viruddham iti cet*

1.3.6 (*pūrva*): *na śāstraparimāṇatvāt*

1.3.7 (*uttara*): *api vā kāraṇāgrahaṇe prayuktāni pratīyeran*

1.3.1 Dharma is defined in JS 1.1.2 as a desirable object the means of knowing which is a Vedic injunction (*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*). That is, dharma is based on scripture (*śabdamūla*). This might imply that ritual elements taught only in *smṛtis* but not in the original Veda cannot be considered proper dharma. They lack scriptural bases (*aśabda*) and therefore are to be disregarded.

1.3.2 But this is not the case. In this case *smṛtis* function as inferential grounds (*anumāna*) by which one can postulate Vedic injunctions. People can infer a Vedic passage although they do not observe it (ŚBh 165.5–6: *anupalabhamānā apy anumimīran*). Therefore *smārta* dharmas are not baseless.

1.3.3 But this procedure of inference is allowed only when the *smṛti* passage in question does not contradict *śrutis* (*asati hy anumānam*). When it contradicts (*virodhe*), it is not to be considered authoritative.

- 1.3.4 Also it is disregarded, because it has an evil motivation such as greed as its cause (*hetudarśanāt*). It does not have a Vedic injunction as its source.
- 1.3.5 Inasmuch as ritual elements enjoined by the Veda (*śiṣṭa*) are not 'irritated' (*akope*) or obstructed,¹⁷ *smārta* elements are not considered contradictory.
- 1.3.6 Some of them might look as if they obstruct the sequence (*krama*) or time (*kāla*) of ritual elements explicitly taught in the Veda. They would prevent the sequence fixed by the Vedic scripture (ŚBh 197.3–4: *śāstraparicchinnam hi kramam bādheran*).
- 1.3.7 But in fact there is no contradiction. These elements that are not found to be motivated by evil causes are authoritative (ŚBh 198.4–5: *agrhyamāṇakāraṇā evaṃjātīyakāḥ pramāṇam*) and are to be performed.

The first *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.1–2, defines *smṛti* as being a secondary source of dharma. The second *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.3–4, explains an exceptional case to the first principle: the case of contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti*. The third *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.5–7, discusses ambiguous cases in which contradiction is suspected. As one can see, the theme discussed here is concerned about the contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti*. It has nothing to do with Buddhist scriptures.

Whereas Śabara never mentions heretics such as Buddhists in this context, Kumārila often mentions them. But why is it necessary to refute Buddhists and so on in technical Mīmāṃsā arguments? Expecting such a question, Kumārila justifies his way of discussion as follows in TV ad 1.3.3–4:¹⁸

To explain: If out of indifference one did not prove that these [heterodox scriptures] are not a means of obtaining correct knowledge, other people would come to have the same view [as the heretics], reasoning that [the lack of the property of being such a means] is impossible [to prove].

¹⁷ The straightforward interpretation of *śiṣṭākope* may be: "Unless qualified persons get angry." But Śabara glosses it as *vaidikaṃ kiṃcin na kupyati* (197.1).

¹⁸ TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.17–18: *yadi hy anādareṇaiṣām na kalpyetāpramāṇatā / aśakyaiveti matvānye bhavyeṣuḥ samadṛṣṭayaḥ //*

Kumārila fears that indifference to opposing heretics would allow them to spread their wrong view. Of course, it is not the main task for a Mīmāṃsaka to refute heterodox teachings under the topic of *smṛti*. As Kumārila states, “This has not been examined in any other chapter” (*na caitat kvacid adhikaraṇāntare nirūpitam*). There is no chapter in the *Jaiminisūtra* that aims at discussing it. However, it is also not the case that such digressive argument is forbidden.

After commenting on Śabara’s traditional view in the first place and proposing his own solutions for JS 1.3.3–4, Kumārila finally introduces an alternative interpretation of the *sūtras* and starts refuting these heterodox *smṛtis*. As Kumārila confirms, “Dharmic cleansing is not accomplished until one has refuted all those [heretics] who[se views] are absolutely incompatible with the orthodox path of the three Vedas.”¹⁹

Kumārila’s excuse for introducing an alternative interpretation suggests that in the Mīmāṃsā tradition before him there had been no argument against heretics in the chapter discussing the authoritativeness of *smṛtis*. It is probably justifiable to guess that it is Kumārila who newly introduced the criticism of the Buddhists and other heretics in the present context. His fear is also clear from the following words: “And against [Mīmāṃsakas], who accept that *smṛtis* by Manu, etc., are also based on a lost branch of the Veda, even Buddhists and other [heretical teachers] can easily insist that [their teachings, too,] are similarly based on it. For who can define the extent of topics discussed in lost [scriptures]?”²⁰

¹⁹ TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.25–26: *trayīmārgasya siddhasya ye hy atyantavirodhinaḥ / anirākṛtya tān sarvān dharmasuddhir na labhyate //*

²⁰ TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.30–195.1: *yaiś ca mānavādisṁṛtīnām apy utsanna-vedaśākhāmūlatvam abhyupagatam, tān prati sutarāṃ śākyādibhir api śakyam tanmūlatvam eva vaktum. ko hi śaknuyād utsannānām vākya-viṣayeyattāniyamam kartum.*

7 Kumārila's theory of lost scripture

Why are the original Vedic sources not perceived, *kimarthaṃ codanā nopalabhyante*?²¹ Kumārila replies to this question by assuming several possibilities.

1. *nityānumeya*

- The original *śruti* passage has never existed in the Veda and therefore never been vocalized. It is always to be inferred (*nityānumeya*).²²

Kumārila rejects this view attributed to “some people” (*kecit*), because it does not postulate a definite Vedic passage as an original source. *Smṛti* is not authoritative in its own right. It always requires a Vedic source for verification.²³ It is difficult to insist that a Vedic injunction existed despite the fact that it has never been vocalized

²¹ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.7.

²² TV ad 1.3.2, 164.7–8: *tatra kecid āhuḥ – nityānumeyās tā na kadācid uc-cāryante*. “With regard to this, some say that those [injunctions] are necessarily to be inferred, they are never uttered.”

²³ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.11: *tat tv ayuktam, andhaparamparānyāyād eva*. “But that is impossible precisely because of the maxim of the [beginning-less] succession of those who are blind [from birth with regard to their knowledge of color].” The maxim *jātyandhaparamparānyāya* is explained in ŚBh ad 1.3.1. A person blind from birth insists that he knows a particular color. When one asks him about the source, he points out another person who is also blind from birth. He too points out yet another blind person as the source of his knowledge. In this way they have no ultimate source of their knowledge with regard to a particular color. In the ŚBh thereon the opponent uses this maxim in order to claim that *smṛtis* which teach the Aṣṭakā, etc., are based on erroneous cognition. ŚBh ad 1.3.1, 162.4–6: *tad yathā kaścij jātyandho vadet “smarāmy aham asya rūpaviśeṣasya” iti. “kutas te pūrvavijñānam” iti ca paryanuyukto jātyandham evāparam vinirdiśet. tasya kutaḥ. jātyandhāntarāt*. “This is similar to the following: a person who is blind from birth says: ‘I have a recollection of this particular color.’ And when he is asked ‘From where [does] your original knowledge [come]?’ he points out yet another person who is also blind from birth. From where [does the knowledge] of the latter [come]? From yet another person who is [also] blind from birth.”

and therefore never witnessed by anyone.²⁴ This view rather proves that the *smṛti* is invalid as being baseless.²⁵ Therefore it is better to assume another possibility.

2. *pralīna*

- The original Vedic passage is lost (*pralīna*). It is conceivable that some parts of the Vedic tradition disappeared (*pralaya*) due to human carelessness, laziness or the like (*pramādālasyaḍibhiḥ*) and due to the extinction of transmitting people (*puruṣakṣayāt*), causing the diminishment of Vedic traditions.²⁶

Kumārila defends this view against a possible objection that any scripture then could be made authoritative. “And even if this is the case, it does not result that anything would be authoritative” (*na caivaṃ sati yat kiṃcit pramāṇam āpatsyate*).²⁷ Why? Kumārila answers: this is because the inference of a *śruti* source is possible through *anyathānupapatti*, i.e. being inexplicable otherwise. Only when a firm tradition (*dr̥ḍhasmaraṇa*) in the brahmanical circles is inexplicable without postulating a Vedic source is one allowed to do so. Otherwise it is not allowed.²⁸ In this way, heretics are not autho-

²⁴ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.11–12: *yā hi codanā na kadācid uccāryate, tasyāḥ sarva-puruṣapratyakṣādiprasarābhāvād durlabhataram astitvam*. “It is very difficult [for us] to obtain [and insist upon] the existence of a Vedic injunction that has never been vocalized, because nobody’s perception, etc., [with regard to it] has ever arisen.”

²⁵ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.12–13: *tathā ca smṛter api saiva vandhyādauhitratulyatā*. “And so *smṛti* remains similar to the grandson of a barren woman.”

²⁶ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.14–15: *tena varam pralīnaśrutyanumānam eva. na ca pralayo na sambhāvyate. dr̥śyate hi pramādālasyaḍibhiḥ puruṣakṣayāc cālpaviṣayatvam*. “Therefore it is better to infer a lost *śruti*. And its loss is not unthinkable, for one observes [today] that topics [dealt with in the Veda] diminish due to human carelessness, laziness or the like and due to the extinction of transmitters.”

²⁷ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.15–16.

²⁸ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.16: *śiṣṭatraivarṇikadr̥ḍhasmaraṇānyathānupapattilabhyatvāc chrutyanumānasya*. “This is because the inference of a [source] *śruti* is attained through ‘being otherwise inexplicable,’ i.e. because the

rized to appeal to the procedure of postulating a Vedic source. Their tradition can be explained in other ways.

The second view accords well with that of Śabara, who concludes that it is possible that later people in the brahmanical tradition may have forgotten the source text. *vismaraṇam apy upapadyate*.²⁹ Kumārila seems to follow Śabara here. He has developed the traditional view and elaborated it in detail. “Even today it is seen that [only] the content is remembered but the text is lost” (TV 165.21: *dr̥śyate hy adyatve ’py arthasmaraṇam granthanāśaś ca*).

3. *anupalabdhi*

Kumārila introduces the third view as an alternative to the second, using the expression *yad vā*.

- The original Vedic passage is still available somewhere in the extant Vedic branches (*vidyamānaśākhā*) but not recognized by us.³⁰

This is possible. But why is a source not perceived, *katham anupalabdhiḥ?*³¹ If the source were still available, all people would learn the matter directly from the Vedic source and not from the *Manusmṛti*.³² Kumārila argues that “the source of the *smṛti* is not observed because Vedic branches are scattered (*viprakīrṇa*), human beings are careless, and [the matter at stake] is [mentioned] in various chapters.”³³

firm tradition of the qualified aryaṇs would be otherwise inexplicable.”

²⁹ ŚBh ad 1.3.2, 165.6.

³⁰ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.16–17: *yad vā vidyamānaśākhāgataśrutimūlatvam evāstu*. “Alternatively, let it be the case that [the *smṛti*] is precisely based on a *śruti* passage of a certain branch that is still extant.”

³¹ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.17.

³² TV ad 1.3.1 (*pūrvapakṣa*), 163.10–11: *atha vidyamānaśākhāgatā evaite ’rthāḥ, tathāpi manvādāya iva sarve puruṣāḥ tata evopalapsyante*. “If these things are precisely taught in a certain extant branch, still, all people will learn them directly from it just as Manu, etc., did.”

³³ TV ad 1.3.2, 164.18–19: *śākhānām viprakīrṇatvāt puruṣāṇām pramādataḥ / nānāprakaraṇasthatvāt smṛter mūlaṁ na dr̥śyate //*

Summary: Kumārila's view

The first view assumes that the source *śruti* never existed from the beginning, whereas the second and the third assume that the source was perceived by the *smṛti* authors. The second further assumes that the source passage, once existent, was lost (*pralīna*, *antarhita*³⁴) due to various reasons, whereas the third assumes that the source is not perceived today although it is still available somewhere in the scattered Vedic branches.

	before	transmission	after
1	<i>anumeya</i>	→	<i>anumeya</i>
2	<i>upalabdha</i>	>>>	<i>pralīna</i>
3	<i>upalabdha</i>	→	<i>anupalabdha</i>

8 Dharmakīrti's criticism: Transmission and interpretation of the Veda

In the last portion of his earliest work, the *Pramāṇavārttika* with its *Svavṛtti*, which Frauwallner tentatively calls *Hetuprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti refutes the authoritativeness of the Veda.

One of his arguments runs as follows: a speaker can explain the meaning of the word he uses, but this is not the case for Vedic statements, which are claimed to be authorless (*apauruṣeya*) by Mīmāṃsakas. Then what are the grounds ensuring the correct interpretation of Vedic sentences? “Therefore, what kind of evidence is there to say that ‘one should eat dog meat’ is not the meaning of the *śruti* passage, *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*?”³⁵

Reciters and interpreters of the Veda may tell lies. Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that human beings are not reliable. Dharmakīrti

³⁴ Kumārila uses the word *antarhita* in TV ad 1.3.11, 229.21: *antarhitavi-prakīrṇānumeyaprāyaśrutimūlasṁṛti[ni]bandhanebhyaḥ ...*

³⁵ PVI 318, Gnoli 167.9–10: *tenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutau / khādec chvamāṃsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra kā pramā //*

sarcastically formulates it as follows:³⁶

Furthermore, here **you** (*bhavān*)³⁷ must have forgotten the complexion of your own face because of the attachment to your own doctrine. [You said:] A statement by a human being is not reliable because he may tell a lie being afflicted **by desire and so on** (*rāgādi*). Therefore, with regard to the present case, too, why don't you examine whether or not this is the case? "The person, when teaching, may teach the Veda or its meaning incorrectly out of affliction."

As reflected in the Vedic sentence *anṛtavādinī vāk* quoted in ŚBh ad 1.2.11 and Kumārila's general statement that clearly presupposes it,³⁸ it is traditionally accepted in Mīmāṃsā that in most cases human beings are liars.

But we can better understand Dharmakīrti's sarcastic counter-argument by taking into consideration Kumārila's criticism of the omniscient Buddha. Kumārila criticizes the teaching Buddha as being motivated by desire, etc. This is stated in ŚV *codanā* 137, where Kumārila presupposes the causal relationship between *rāgādi* and *vyāpāra*. If one has no desire, one does not undertake an action. Therefore the Buddha cannot be the speaker of the teaching.³⁹

³⁶ PVSV ad I 319, Gnoli 168.26–4: *api cātra bhavān svam eva mukha-varṇaṃ svavādānurāgān nūnaṃ viśmṛtavān* – "puruṣo **rāgādibhir** upa-pluto 'nṛtam api brūyād iti nāsyā vacanaṃ pramāṇam" iti. tad ihāpi kiṃ na pratyavekṣyate "sambhavati na vā" iti. sa evopadiśann upaplavād vedaṃ vedārthaṃ vānyathāpy upadiśed iti.

³⁷ It may be possible that there is a double meaning here and that *atra bhavān* could sarcastically be used, in addition, as an honorific pronoun "your Honor," although Karṇakagomin takes *atra* of *atra bhavān* as referring to what a Mīmāṃsaka holds as tenet regarding the Veda.

³⁸ ŚBh ad 1.2.11: *prāyāc cānṛtavādinī vāg iti*; ŚV *codanā* 144ab: *sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādināḥ*. "And, at any time, human beings are in most cases liars."

³⁹ ŚV *codanā* 137: *rāgādirahite cāsmīn nirvyāpāre vyavasthite / deśanānya-praṇītaiva syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt* // "And because he was devoid of any desire, etc., and [therefore] remained without activity [e.g. of speaking], his teaching must have been composed by someone else without [proper] reflection." See Kataoka 2003a: 180ff. and 2003b: 55ff. for further discussion regarding this verse. Kataoka 2003a (written in Japanese)

rāgādi ⇒ *vyāpāra (deśanā)*
rāgādi ⇒ *vyāpāra (deśanā)*

Not only in the *Ślokavārttika* but also in the *Tantravārttika* Kumārila repeats the same view.⁴⁰ The Buddha and other heretical teachers al-

discusses in detail the correspondence between ŚV *codanā* 137 and PV I 12, in particular Dharmakīrti's general discussion concerning *śeṣavad anumānam* and *vipakṣe 'drṣṭimātreṇa* and its particular application to the Buddha's speech. The same theme is dealt with recently by Pecchia 2008, who apparently has not noticed the existence of Kataoka 2003a. In connection to PV I 12 Pecchia 2008: 165, n. 5 quotes Kataoka 2003b and states: "In analyzing *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) 3156–3157 and the *Pañjikā* (TSP) thereon, Kataoka (2003: 60f.) suggests that Dharmakīrti's commentary *ad* PV I.12 addresses *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) *Codanā* 137, while Taber (forthco., n. 22) states that TS 3156 may be taken from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, which is very similar to ŚV *codanā* 132. It would seem to me that Ratnakīrti's exposition in SS 23,19f. (see Bühnemann 1980: 142, n. 512) supports this latter hypothesis: the *kārikā* corresponding to TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* and is followed by the quotation of ŚV *Codanā* 132." But nowhere in Kataoka 2003b: 60f. can I find the analysis of TS 3156–3157 and the *Pañjikā* which Pecchia claims Kataoka analyzes. Furthermore, it is not clear at all what kind of Kataoka's hypothesis she criticizes. Pecchia implies here that Kataoka 2003b: 60f. denies the claim that TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (BṬ). But, again, nowhere in Kataoka 2003b: 60f. is it denied. Furthermore, I cannot understand why Kataoka's claim "that Dharmakīrti's commentary *ad* PV I.12 addresses *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) *Codanā* 137" is incompatible with Taber's claim that "TS 3156 may be taken from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*." In fact Kataoka 2003a fully agrees with the claim that TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to BṬ. Kataoka 2003b generally agrees to the hypothesis by Frauwallner 1962 that TS quotes from BṬ and not ŚV. In order to make sense of Pecchia's statement, one has to postulate that Pecchia presupposes in general that Dharmakīrti's PV I criticizes Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* and never *Ślokavārttika*. Does she really presuppose this? It seems to be the case that Pecchia's understanding of Kataoka 2003b relies on a brief note of Taber's article (2011:445, n.23). Taber's note itself is correct but Pecchia seems to have misunderstood its implication. She criticizes Kataoka 2003b without reading it properly, by relying on and misunderstanding the implication of Taber's note.

⁴⁰ TV *ad* 1.3.3–4, 195.27–30: *lobhādi kāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate / yasmin sannihite dṛṣṭe nāsti mūlāntarānumā //* śākyādayaś ca

ways teach dharma out of greed and other evil motivations (*lobhādi kāraṇam*).

It is possible to explain Dharmakīrti's counterattack as addressed to Kumārila. First Kumārila criticizes the Buddha and says: the Buddhist scripture is not reliable, because it is composed by a human being who by his very nature often tells lies, being motivated by desire, greed and other evil causes. Dharmakīrti repeats the same argument back to Kumārila and criticizes him as follows: even if we admit your thesis that the Veda is not composed by any human being, the Veda nonetheless remains invalid, because its reciters and interpreters are not trustworthy, as you pointed out yourself. Defective factors derived from human beings may well have crept into the Veda in its transmission and interpretation, even if they are not originally inherent in the Veda itself.

	author		scripture				
B:	Buddha	⇒	<i>sūtra</i>	→	transmission	+	<i>śāstra</i>
K:	Buddha	⇒	<i>sūtra</i>				
D:	φ	⇒	Veda	→	transmission	+	interpretation

(B: Buddhist; K: Kumārila; D: Dharmakīrti)

Recall also the parallel structure of the Buddhist theorization of *sūtra* and *śāstra*. Dharmakīrti's insulting address to "You (*bhavān*)" may have been aimed at Kumārila and not Mīmāṃsakas in general. This impression is further strengthened by an argument that follows immediately afterwards in PVSV.

9 Transmission of the Veda

Dharmakīrti continues his argument as follows:

sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām / hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate // "Here [in the teaching of the Buddha, etc.], many other causes such as greed are understood. Where they are seen to be present, another cause [such as the Vedas] cannot be inferred. And whenever the Buddha and so forth deliver a teaching of a dharma, they never deliver [one] which is free of [evil] causes."

(1) “For we learn that there are some branches of the Veda that were once lost but have been recovered (*utsannoddhṛta*) by some people [such as Yājñavalkya].”⁴¹

(2) “Even today some branches have few reciters (*viralādhyeṭṛka*).”⁴²

Here and in the following Dharmakīrti describes the situation of the Vedic transmission and points out its unreliability. The Vedic tradition sometimes shrinks and sometimes grows. This must always have been the case, as we witness today. Remember that Kumārila makes reference to the shrinkage of the Vedic traditions⁴³ and contemporaneous loss of scriptures.⁴⁴

(3) Even the major branches (*pracurādhyeṭṛka*) may have been minor ones at some point.⁴⁵

Thus it is quite conceivable that this limited number of propagators might have incorrectly transmitted Vedic scriptures.

(4) Even today we witness that devotees (*bhakta*) thoughtlessly put faith in the most revered of the many transmitters.

The whole tradition, although major today, might have derived from a single ‘respected’ teacher (*sambhāvitāt puruṣāt*). Deception (*vipralambha*) easily happens.⁴⁶

⁴¹ PVSV ad 319, Gnoli 169.4–5: (1) *śrūyante hi kaiścīt puruṣair utsannoddhṛtāni śākhāntarāṇi*; cf. also PVSVT 596.11–12: *kaiścīt puruṣair yājñavalkyaprabhṛtibhir utsannoddhṛtāni*.

⁴² PVSV ad 319, Gnoli 169.5: (2) *idānīm api kānicid viralādhyeṭṛkāṇi*.

⁴³ See n. 26.

⁴⁴ TV ad 1.3.2, 165.21: *dṛśyate hy adyatve ’py arthasmarāṇaṃ granthanāśaś ca*. “Even today it is seen that [only] the content is remembered but the texts is lost.”

⁴⁵ PVSV 169.6–10: (3) *tadvat pracurādhyeṭṛkāṇām api kasmimścīt kāle kathamcīt saṃhārasambhavāt. punaḥ sambhāvitapuruṣapratyayāt pracurātopagamanasambhāvanāsambhavāt. teṣāṃ ca punaḥ pratānayitṛṇām kadācid adhītavismṛtādhyayanānām anyeṣāṃ vā sambhāvanābhraṃśabhayādinānyathopadeśasambhavāt*.

⁴⁶ PVSV 169.10–13: (4) *tatpratyayāc ca tadbhaktānām avicāreṇa pratipatter bahuṣv adhyeṭṛṣu sambhāvitāt puruṣād bahulaṃ pratipattidarśanāt. tato ’pi kathamcīd vipralambhasambhavāt*.


1	<i>śākhā</i>	>>>	φ	<<<	recovered	(<i>utsannoddhṛta</i>)
2	<i>śākhā</i>	>>>	shrink	>>>	minor	(<i>viralādhyeṭṛka</i>)
3	<i>śākhā</i>	>>>	shrink	<<<	major	(<i>pracurādhyeṭṛka</i>)
4	<i>śākhā</i>	>>>	a teacher	<<<	major	(<i>pracurādhyeṭṛka</i>)

10 Comparison between Dharmakīrti and Kumārila concerning the transmission of the Veda

Here and above, Dharmakīrti points out problems inherent to the transmission of the textual form and meaning of the Veda. The Veda and *vedārtha* can be easily transmitted in a wrong way. Transmission of the correct form and correct interpretation of Vedic words are not as certain as Mīmāṃsakas optimistically claim. Dharmakīrti's criticism can be better understood if we compare it with Kumārila's description of Vedic transmission.

TV ad 1.3.1 (*pūrvapakṣa*) compares the safety of transmission of the Veda with the uncertainty of that of *smṛtis*. The Veda has been passed down to the successive generations with certainty. A particular form of the Veda, which is perceivable like a pot, was uttered by a reciter, perceived by another and then recollected by itself (Generation *n*). The next generation perceived the Veda recollected by the preceding generation and then itself recollected it (Generation *n+1*). The same process has repeated itself continuously. Thus, the correct form of the Veda has been transmitted with certainty in the regular cycle of perception and recollection.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ TV ad 1.3.1, 162.11–14: *vedaḥ punaḥ saviśeṣaḥ pratyakṣagamyāḥ. ta-tra ghaṭādivad eva puruṣāntarastham upalabhya smaranti. tair api smṛtam upalabhyānye 'pi smaranto 'nyebhyas tathaiva samarpayantīty anāditā. sarvasya cātmīyasmarāṇāt pūrvam upalabdhiḥ sambhavadīti na nirmūlatā*. “Furthermore, the Veda, which has a particular form, is perceptible. This being the case, [it is possible that] just as one recalls something such as a pot [which another person possesses, so does] one recall [the Veda] which someone else possesses. Yet another person, too, after having perceived [the Veda] recalled by a [previous generation], passes it on to another [generation] in the same way. Thus [the transmission] is beginningless. And [their recollection] is not baseless,



In this way the *Tantravārttika* describes the continuity of Vedic tradition. Kumārila's optimistic view on the Vedic transmission is also clear in the *Ślokavārttika*. Here he compares the widespread transmission of the Veda with that of heretical scriptures.⁴⁸

In the case of the Veda, because it resides in many people and it is [first] learned and [then] recollected in only one life, its independence [and reliability] is not nullified. And, if [someone] changed the [Veda], [the change] would be prevented from many [sides].

The Veda has been correctly transmitted because its transmission has been sustained by many people, whereas the correctness of a heretical tradition is doubtful because it ultimately originated in a single person, the originator of the tradition. Kumārila's main argument is the widespread dispersal of the Veda transmitted by "many people" (*anekapuruṣa*). This reason is exactly the target of Dharmakīrti's criticism. He points out that in fact the Vedic tradition is not so secure. It is possible that the tradition might have declined considerably, the tradition we have today might have been transmitted by a single person at some point, and changes or mistakes might have been left uncorrected. Dharmakīrti's criticism of an anonymous Mīmāṃsaka (in sections 8 and 9) exposes Kumārila's optimism.

because everyone perceived [the Veda] before recalling their own."

⁴⁸ ŚV *codanā* vv. 149–150ab: *anekapuruṣasthatvād ekatraiva ca janmani / grahaṇasmaranād vede na svātantryaṃ vihanyate // anyathākaraṇe cāsya *bahubhyaḥ syān nivāraṇam /*

*For *bahubhyaḥ* there is a variant reading *bahubhiḥ*, which is more straightforward and which is supported by Pārthasārathi. But I adopt here the inferior reading *bahubhyaḥ*, which is supported by many manuscripts and other testimonies such as NKC 724.6, because it seems more likely that *bahubhiḥ* is a secondary attempt to make the text smoother than that it is original and *bahubhyaḥ* an alteration of it.

11 Limited tradition: *śāstraparimāṇa*

The correspondence between Dharmakīrti's arguments and Kumā-
rila's is further confirmed by a criticism that immediately follows in
the PVSV. Dharmakīrti states as follows:⁴⁹

Furthermore, I hear even from you (*bhavatām api śṛṇumah*) the [brah-
manical] tradition of only a limited number of interpreters [of the Veda].
Among them, someone might be either hostile, ignorant, or rogues.
Therefore [we have] no confidence [in this tradition].

Dharmakīrti claims here that the Vedic exegetical tradition is in fact
not sustained by many people, as the Mīmāṃsakas claim. The Veda
has been interpreted by a limited number of people. Here Dharmakīrti
is referring to the Mīmāṃsā claim that the number of proper in-
terpreters of the Veda (*vyākhyātr̥puruṣa*) is limited (*parimita*). Only
a limited number of people (such as Jaimini) can be orthodox inter-
preters. In other words, the Vedic exegetical tradition is limited. But
where did Dharmakīrti *hear* the brahmanical tradition of the limit-
ed number of interpreters (*parimitavyākhyātr̥puruṣaparamparām ...*
śṛṇumah)?

The view is in fact found in the *Tantravārttika*, commenting on
JS 1.3.6, *na śāstraparimāṇatvāt*. A traditional interpretation, which
Śabara presents, and Kumābila as well in his first interpretation,
takes this as referring to the measurement of time taught in the Veda
concerning ritual elements (*śāstritaṃ parimāṇam*), such as temporal
proximity (*pratyāsatti*), time of performance (*prayogakāla*) and se-
quence (*krama*). "Measurement taught in Vedic injunction" (*śāstritaṃ*
parimāṇam) is the meaning of *śāstraparimāṇa*. This, of course, does
not match Dharmakīrti's description.

It is Kumābila's second interpretation that fits Dharmakīrti's ref-
erence. As I have pointed out, Kumābila reinterprets JS 1.3.3–4 in a
unique way. The focus of argument is changed from Manu, etc., to the
Buddha, etc. "Contradiction" mentioned in JS 1.3.3 (*virodhe tv ana-*

⁴⁹ PVSV 169.13–15: *kiṃ ca parimitavyākhyātr̥puruṣaparamparām eva*
cātra bhavatām api śṛṇumah. tatra kaścīd dviṣṭājñadhūrtānām anyata-
maḥ syād apīty anāśvāsaḥ.

pekṣyaṃ syāt) is not the contradiction of the Veda with the *Manusmṛti*, but with the heretical scriptures. The evil causes or motivations mentioned in JS 1.3.4 (*hetudarśanāt*) are not those of Manu and other orthodox teachers but of the Buddha and other heretical teachers. Note that Kumāṛila himself makes excuses for introducing a new interpretation of JS 1.3.3–4.

		traditional view	reinterpretation
1.3.3	<i>virodha</i>	Manu, etc.	Buddha, etc.
1.3.4	<i>hetu</i>	Manu, etc.	Buddha, etc.
1.3.6	<i>śāstraparimāṇa</i>	<i>krama</i> , etc.	14 or 18 branches

Similarly, Kumāṛila reinterprets *śāstraparimāṇa*, mentioned in JS 1.3.6. *Parimāṇa* is not “measurement” but “limitation.” Authoritative teachings are limited (*parimitāni ca śāstrāṇi*). Therefore, the heretical scriptures are not regarded as proper *śāstras*. Only the brahmanical *śāstras*, e.g. the fourteen branches of science (*caturdaśavidyāsthāna*), are proper teachings.⁵⁰

For only limited branches of science, either fourteen or eighteen, are accepted by the learned as the valid source of dharma. Namely, those called *veda*, *upaveda*, *aṅga*, *upāṅga*, eighteen *dharmasaṃhitās*, *purāṇa-śāstra*, *śikṣā* and *daṇḍanīti*. And among them, scriptures of Buddhists, Jains, etc., are neither listed nor accepted.

Judging from the manner of Kumāṛila’s presentation, it seems unlikely that Kumāṛila’s reinterpretation of *śāstraparimāṇa* goes back to some unknown predecessor between Śābara and Kumāṛila. It is likely that Dharmakīrti is referring to Kumāṛila’s unique interpretation of *śāstraparimāṇa* when he states that Mīmāṃsakas accept only a limited number of exegetical traditions. Kumāṛila uses the word *parimita* intending that dharmic teaching (*śāstra*) is ‘limited’ to the elite tradition and thus excludes heretical traditions. But this also implies that secondary literature based on the Veda is limited and

⁵⁰ TV ad 1.3.5–7, 201.23–25: *parimitāny eva hi caturdaśāṣṭādaśa vā vidyāsthānāni dharmapramāṇatvena śiṣṭaiḥ parigrhītāni vedopavedāṅgopāṅgāṣṭādasadharmasaṃhitāpurāṇaśāstraśikṣādaṇḍanītisaṃjñakāni, na ca teṣāṃ madhye bauddhārhatādigranthāḥ smṛtā grhītā vā.*

that interpreters of the Veda are in fact not many.⁵¹ Dharmakīrti re-interprets *parimita* as referring to 'a limited small number' and then counterattacks Kumārila by making this argument of *vedavyākhyāna* parallel to the shrinkage of Vedic transmission.⁵²

⁵¹ For Kumārila *śāstra* in *śāstraparimāṇa* refers to the Vedas and other dharmic teachings, i.e. fourteen or eighteen branches of science, which are transmitted only by the brahmanical tradition represented by learned *śiṣṭas*. It is dharmic teachings (*śāstra*) that are limited (*parimita*) for him. For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, it is *vyākhyātr̥puruṣa* that is limited (*parimita*). Therefore, there is a difference between their understandings with regard to the object being limited. But it is not the case that Dharmakīrti's criticism does not hold. If it is claimed by a Mīmāṃsaka that the number of *śāstras* (brahmanical dharmic teachings) is limited, it implies that the number of *vyākhyāna* (such as *smṛti* literature) and *vyākhyātr̥puruṣa* (such as Manu) is also limited. Therefore, Dharmakīrti's twist is not a mere distortion. Rather he skillfully trips up Kumārila's argument. And we can better understand the process of Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *śāstra* that he claims hears from a Mīmāṃsaka by taking into consideration the Buddhist usage of *śāstra*. In the Buddhist tradition *śāstra* is often contrasted with *sūtra*. It refers to *vyākhyāna* kind of literature such as *abhidharma*. Therefore one can imagine that when Dharmakīrti heard *śāstraparimāṇa* from a Mīmāṃsaka, he interpreted it as referring to the limitation of *vyākhyāna* literature. Thus Dharmakīrti's argument of *parimitavyākhyātr̥puruṣa* makes sense in the context of the present discussion of scriptural transmission.

⁵² The relevant portion of PVSV (ad PV I 319) can be analyzed as follows. Note that 5.2 (on *vedavyākhyāna*) is an argument parallel to 5.1 (on *veda*). Both provide with the reason for unreliability due to a limited number of people.

- 1 It is impossible to know the meanings of Vedic words either by *loka*, *sampradāya* or *yukti*. 168.3–4
 - 2 *Lokavyavahāra* is not reliable with respect to supersensible meanings. 168.5–15
 - 3 The exegetical tradition of the Vedas is not reliable either. 168.15–22
 - 4 Human faults may creep into the transmission of the textual form and of the interpretation of the Vedas. 168.22–26
 - 5 Mīmāṃsakas agree that human beings are not reliable. 168.26–169.4
- 5.1 Shrinkage, etc., of the transmission of the Vedas do happen. 169.4–13

JS 1.3.6:	<i>śāstraparimāṇatvāt</i>
ŚBh:	<i>śāstraparicchinnaṃ hi kramaṃ bādheran</i>
TV 1:	<i>śāstritaṃ (padārthānāṃ) parimāṇam</i>
TV 2:	<i>śāstrāṇi parimitāni</i>
PVSV:	<i>parimitavyākhyāṭṭpuruṣaparamparā</i>

12 History reconstructed

Just as Buddhists normally conceptualize *sūtras* as being more authoritative than *śāstras*, Mīmāṃsakas generally regard *śrutis* as superseding *smṛtis*.⁵³

	primary		secondary
Buddhism:	<i>sūtra</i>	>	<i>śāstra</i>
Mīmāṃsā	<i>śruti</i>	>	<i>smṛti</i>

The latter are secondary criteria for dharma and therefore not independently authoritative. If they contradict *śrutis*, *smṛtis* are disregarded. Only when there is no contradiction is it allowed to postulate an unobservable *śruti* passage from a *smṛti*. The Mīmāṃsā idea

5.2 Mīmāṃsakas do agree that the exegetical tradition is limited. 169.13–15

6 Conclusion: it is impossible to know the meanings of the Vedas either by *vyākhyāna* or *lokavyavahāra*. 169.16–17

7 One cannot decide a correct meaning out of many by reasoning (*na yukteḥ*). 169.17–24

⁵³ Kumārila finally solves the problem concerning contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti* by denying the existence of contradiction itself. He claims that there is no contradiction at all between the two. See TV ad 1.3.3–4, A 193.11. This peculiar view of his, which is quite different from Śābara's traditional view, is clearly motivated by the desire not to nullify the authoritativeness of *smṛti*. He thinks that the authoritativeness of *smṛti* should not easily be discarded. In Kumārila's time circumstances concerning the authoritativeness of *smṛti* are different from those in Śābara's time.

of *avirodha* and *pralīna* roughly corresponds to the Buddhist theory of *aviloma* and *antarhita*.⁵⁴

	postulation	
Buddhism: (<i>sūtra</i>)	←	<i>śāstra</i>
Mīmāṃsā: (<i>śruti</i>)	←	<i>smṛti</i>

In both traditions postulation of a lost scripture is required to verify some of their teachings. But this strategy also allows a counterargument for their opponents, such as Mahāyāna for Vaibhāṣikas and heretics for Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila is well aware of this danger when he defends the Brahmanical tradition of the Veda and its subordinate literature such as *smṛtis*. Opponents can similarly claim that their doctrine, too, is based on the lost scripture that proponents resort to.

	postulation	
Heretics:		doctrine
	✓	
Mīmāṃsā: (<i>śruti</i>)	←	<i>smṛti</i>

Kumārila refutes this argument in two ways. The heretical doctrines that are clearly contradictory to the Veda are easily disregarded. On

⁵⁴ The Abhidharma *śāstra* can be regarded as the Buddha's own words, because it does not contradict (*na vilomayati*) *dharmatā*. Some Abhidharma doctrines that are not found in the original *sūtras* are defended by recourse to the theory of 'lost *sūtra*' (*antarhita*). See Honjo 1989 and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explained there (Taisho 27,1a–2a11). Cf. MSABh 1.10.1: *buddhavacanasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam, yat sūtre 'vatarati, vinaye saṃdrśyate, dharmatām ca na vilomayati*. "The defining characteristic of the Buddha's words is as follows: it appears in the *sūtra*, it is observed in the *vinaya*, and it does not contradict *dharmatā*." AKBh ad 2.55d, 91.22–23: *yady api noktaḥ, na tu pratiśiddhaḥ. sūtrāṇi ca bahūny antarhitānīti katham etan nirdhāryate nokta iti*. "Although it is not taught [that *asaṃskṛta* is a *hetu*], still, it is not denied. Furthermore, since many *sūtras* are lost, how can one determine that it is not taught [in *sūtras*]?" Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā*, AKBhV 320.26–27: *na tu pratiśiddhaḥ. dharmatāyā avirodhān na doṣa ity abhiprāyaḥ*. "[When the author states] 'It is not denied,' what he has in mind is that there is no problem because it does not contradict *dharmatā*."

the other hand, those heretical doctrines that do not explicitly contradict the Veda can also be excluded by limiting the Vedic tradition. Only a limited number of teachings, 14 or 18 branches of science, are authorized as being Vedic. Therefore Buddhists, etc., cannot appeal to the Veda.

Heretics:		doctrine	<u>(bāhya)</u>
	↘		
Mīmāṃsā: (śruti)	←	smṛti	<u>(parimita)</u>

Dharmakīrti most probably presupposes Kumārila as his Mīmāṃsaka opponent. Instead of claiming that the Buddha's teaching is based on a lost Veda, Dharmakīrti chooses a different strategy when criticizing Mīmāṃsā views. He argues against Kumārila by using Kumārila's own arguments concerning the authoritativeness of the orthodox traditions and the unauthoritativeness of the heterodox traditions.

Kumārila contends that the Vedic tradition is secure and free of human errors because many people transmitted this beginningless scripture and checked each other, whereas the Buddhist tradition ultimately originates in a single person. Kumārila criticizes the Buddha as being motivated by *rāga*, *lobha*, etc.

source				<i>paramparā</i>
Buddha	⇒	<i>sūtra</i>	⇒	transmission+interpretation
φ	⇒	Veda	⇒	transmission+interpretation

Dharmakīrti presents the counterargument that Kumārila's attribution of *rāgādi* to the Buddha applies similarly to the transmitters and interpreters of the Veda. The Vedic tradition is not free of human errors and defects. Here the focus of debate is not on the original source but the successive transmission.

Dharmakīrti points out that the present tradition of the Veda, even though transmitted and interpreted by many, might be traced to just a single person. He also points out that Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that the tradition is limited (*parimita*). Some interpreters might be ignorant or rogues. Then how could one trust such a

limited tradition? Thus it is impossible to know the original meaning of the Veda (PVSV 169.17: *na vedārthasiddhiḥ*).

The Veda might be non-human-made (*apauruṣeya*). But its transmission, concerning its form and interpretation, is not free of human defects. Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that human beings are in most case liars. Here there is a chance that human errors creep into the Vedic tradition.

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Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

AKBh *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1967.

Jaiminisūtra

JS See ŚBh.

Tantravārttika

TV See ŚBh.

Nyāyakumudacandra

NKC *Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra of Śrīmat Prabhācandrācārya. A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva's Laghīyastraya*. 2 vols. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1991.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti

PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente 1960.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā

PVSVṬ *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) Svopajñavṛtṭyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrṭyāyana. Allahabad 1943.

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ŚBh *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ mīmāṃsādarśanam*. Ed. Subbāśāstrī. 6 parts. Poona: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya 1929–34.

F See Frauwallner 1968.

Ślokovārttika

ŚV *Ślokovārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa

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Sphuṭārthā

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